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\VooDs v. SEcURITY-FIRST NAT. BANK 
[46 C.2d 697; 299 P.2d 657] 
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powers or consider ''the eircnm-
of the parties" and then held in accon1anee ·with the 
record that no of any kind had been shown for 
snit money to the wife. 
Eneh order is affirmed. 
C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Carter, .J., 
.L. concurred. 
.J., and Spence, 
petition of appl'llani in L . .A. 23409 for a rehearing 
dl'nil'd Jnl~- 1956. 
rL. A. No. 23569. In Bank. .June 28, 1956.] 
,\LUtN I1EE \YOODR, Appellant, ,._ SECTTin'l'Y-FTHST 
NA'l'IONATJ BANK OF LOS ANGEI1ES (a Corpora-
tion), as Exe,·ntor. <"te ., rt al., 
[1 Husband and Wife- Changing Character of Property by 
Agreement.-Separate property of husband or wife may lw 
eonvrrted into community property or dec t•cr.'a at any tinw 
oral agreement hetwePn tlw spousP~. (Per .T., 
Gibson, C . .J., and Shenk, .J.) 
!d.-Marriage Settlements - Antenuptial Agreements.-- An 
oral antenuptial agreement is pffective if it is exPcuted su hse-
Ser~ Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, ~ 58. 
McK. Dig, References: [1, 3-G] Husband and Wife, § 159; [2] 
Husband and Wife, § 19; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 991. 
698 ·wooDs v. SEcuRITY-FIRsT NAT. BANK [46 C.2d 
acts and conduct in 
confirmation of it. Carter, J., C. and J.) 
[3] !d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-A show-
that there was an oral agreement before that 
the wife's property was to be property and that 
after the marriage it was that her property "had be-
come" declared to her hus-
band and to become 
to which made out a clear 
an executed agreement which transmuted the prop-
J., Gibson, C. and Shenk, 
[4] !d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-Mutual 
consent of the spouses is consideration for an agreement to 
transmute the wife's separate property to community property. 
(Per Carter, J., Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J.) 
[5] !d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-An oral 
agreement between spouses for transmutation of the wife's 
separate property to community property is fully performed 
when the agreement is made, since it immediately transmutes 
and converts such separate propert5T to community property 
and nothing further remains to be done. (Per Carter, J., Gibsm~, 
C. J., and Shenk, J.) 
[6] !d.-Changing Character of Property by Agreement.-In an 
action by a surviving husband to obtain property which stood 
in his deceased wife's name at the time of her death, where 
it was not clear from the findings whether an agreement for 
transmutation of the wife's separate property to community 
property created a community property life estate in the 
property with a present vested remainder interest in the whole 
in him or whether the spouses were to hold the property as 
community in fee simple and decedent would either not will 
away her half of it or would will it to him, a judgment that 
the surviving husband had no interest in the property could 
not be affirmed on the theory that the findings must be con-
strued to support the judgment. (Per Carter, J., Gibson, C. J., 
and Shenk, J.) 
[7] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Conclusiveness of 
Decree.-\Vhere a surviving husband filed a petition to deter-
mine heirship in the estate of his deceased wife and the court 
determined that he was entitled to one half of the property, 
such decision is res judicata in a subsequent action by him 
to obtain propPrty which stood in decedent's name at the time 
of her death; it is immaterial whether the probate court 
found the property to he community or RPpa t':ltP, it having-
ihP powPt' to <leterminc tlrP que;;tion of hPirship ]li'I'SPllt<'d hy 
:r pPtition properly innlking the jurisdidion of the eourt 
under Proh. Code, § 1080, and the fact that the petition also 
sought to have the entire estate declared to be community 
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Court o:f Los 
Reversed with 
uw>uauu to obtain which 
name at time of her death. Judg-
"'-''·L"""'"'u""' reversed with directions. 
and John J. 
and Rex W. Kramer for Respondents. 
Cki\RTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in an 
in which he sought to obtain property which stood in 
deceased wife's, Eugenic's, name at the time of her death. 
From the findings of the court it appears that defendant 
is the executor of Eugenie's will, she having died on 
28, 1949, at the age of 91. Plaintiff and decedent were 
on January 14, 1949. (The other defendants are 
under the will.) At the time of the marriage 
"'""'"'""""'" owned considerable real and personal property and 
agreed with him [plaintiff] that if they were 
ma.:rri.ea, all of her property would become community prop-
and would become his property at her death. 
the marriage of plaintiff and said decedent, she 
declared to plaintiff and to others that by reason of 
marriage the property had become the community prop-
of herself and plaintiff and would become his her 
to which statement plaintiff assented; and said decedent 
.rnren<1ea by such declarations to transmute her separate prop-
to community property. At the time of the marriage of 
plaJlllLlll and decedent, and thereafter, plaintiff was pos-
of no property, except items of personal use and adorn-
. . . . After the said. marriage plaintiff earned no money 
contributed nothing in the way of property, money, or 
to the community. After the marriage, said de-
did nothing in tile way of the transmutation of her 
property, except to make tile oral declarations here-
stated; she did not part with tile control of any of 
property or put the possession of any of it in plaintiff; 
plain-
continued to live as her 
made after her 
as well 
may have made 
any action on the part of her 
transfer control or '' 
conclusions of law the court declared that plaintiff had 
interest in any of decedent's property a homestead 
set aside in the probate proceedings for a of five years; 
that all the property was her separate property and she had 
not any of it to plaintiff; that the "oral agreements 
and declarations between the parties hereinbefore found were 
not executed or consummated'' and such agreements and dec-
larations were barred by section 1624, subdivisions 3 and 6 of 
the Civil Code, 1 and section 1973, subdivisions 3 and 6 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure,2 and section 1091 of the Civil Code.3 
,Judgment for defendants followed accordingly. 
Decedent left a will executed before her marriage to plain-
tiff in which she left some property to plaintiff, her servant; 
that bequest was cancelled by a later codicil. Whether she 
successfully disinherited plaintiff, her after acquired spouse 
Prob. Code, § 70; Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280 
P .2d 908] ) , is not before us. 
Plaintiff contends that the judgment is not supported by 
the findings above quoted because thereunder there was an 
executed oral agreement transmuting decedent's separate 
property to community property; that an order of the court 
1
'' The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
charged or by his agent: ... 
'' :;. An agreement made upon consideration of marriage other than 
a mutual promise to marry; ... 
''G .... an agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or to make 
nny provision for any persons by will .... " (Civ. Code, § 1624, subds. 
3, 6.) 
2 The Code of Civil Procedure provision corresponds with section 1624, 
snbd. 3, and subd. G of the Civil Code, snpra. 
'"'An estate in real property, other than an estate at will or for a 
term not exeeeding one year, can be transferred only by operation of 
law, or by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing 
of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing." (Civ. 
Code, § 1091.) 
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it 
is effective if it is executed 
as disclosed acts and conduct in confirmation of 
v. J[cnney, 220 Cal. 134 [30 P.2d ; Handley 
113 Cal.App.2d 280 [248 P.2d 59] ; Estate of 
81 Cal.App.2d 348 [183 P.2d 919] .) 
Defendants contend, however, that there was no agreement 
the property was to be community; that if there was 
an agreement neither it nor the prenuptial agreement 
consummated, pointing out that it has been held that 
is not such an execution of an oral marriage settle-
contract as will take it out of the statute of frauds. 
Hughes v. Hughes, 49 Cal.App. 206 [J93 P. 144]; 13 
811-812.) 
The findings of the court above clearly show 
agreement before marriage that decedent's property 
be community property. After the marriage it was 
that her property "had become" community property. 
This follows from the finding that decedent declared to 
and others that the property had become community 
to which declaration plaintiff asseutecl; that by such 
to which plaintiff decedent intruded to 
her separate property to property. 
a case of an executed which trans-
muted the property. The court >vent on to find that no action 
taken by deeedent or plaintiff to transfer title, eontrol 
and the property continued to be treated as 
thus indieating it thought the law to be that some 
in addition to the was necessary before the 
agreement was executed, but as later discussed that was not 
necessary. 
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An such as we have here has as ~w"'""''cn:a~, 
if any is needed, the mutual consent of the spouses. 
(See Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal.2d 788 
f108 P.2d 405], and cases there cited; see Title Ins. &; Trust 
Co. 153 CaL 1 [94 P. 94] .) [5] In Estate of 
Raphael, 91 931, 939 [206 P.2d , it is said.: 
''The of the oral agreement of transmutation was 
fully when the agreement was made for it 
transmuted and converted the separate of 
each spouse into community property, and nothing further 
remained to be done.'' In that case, other than 
of the oral agreement that separate property of one spouse 
was to be community property, nothing was shown except 
the making of income tax returns treating the property a~ 
community. No transfers or instruments of conveyance were 
executed and no delivery of possession of property made. The 
tax returns were not essentially different in effect than dece-
dent's declaration in the instant case that the property was 
community. In most of the other cases dealing with oral 
transmutation agreements there was evidence of various things 
such as the use of the property by the spouses as though it 
were of the character to which it was transmuted by agree-
ment, commingling of property and similar factors, but the 
language stating the rule in the cases is broad. Those other 
ihings are only evidence which may sustain or refute the 
existence of an agreement for transmutation or its execution; 
none of the cases hold that they are indispensable. Recogniz-
ing the practice of informality in property dealings between 
husband and wife it appears there was nothing more to be 
done in this case. The transmutation had taken place; it 
was a fait ae;cornpli. It is not surprising under the facts 
in the instant case that nothing more was done since the 
parties were married only about four months before decedent's 
death. If other things are indispensable as argued by de-
fendants, then in cases of the death of a spouse shortly 
after the agreement, the rule would generally not apply 
because of the physical improbability of the time to do those 
things. We know of no such limitation on the rule. 
[6] Plaintiff claims more than one-half of the community 
property notwithstanding d<>crdcnt 's lw.lf was given to others 
by tlw will. He asserts that the agrr·rnwnt l1etween aecedent 
and him creatl'cl a community property life estate in the 
property with a present vested remainder interest in the 
whole in him; the vested remainder portion of the agreement 
0 
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wonld be created at the same time 
it is not clear from the court 
heretofore w hethr'r a 
and ye"ted remainder were created or 
decedent were to hold the property as 
in fee and decedent would either not will 
her half of it or would will it to plaintiff. If it is the 
fJ""''uvcuL is confronted with subdivision 6 of Civil Code 
1624, quoted S1lpra, and that portion of the agreement 
not executed because decedent did leave a will and did 
not leave the property to plaintiff. If the findings are subject 
latter construction, the judgment cannot be affirmed on 
that the findings must be construed to support the 
because the court found that plaintiff obtained no 
in the property by the agreement and it is not found 
that portion of the agreement making the property 
is separable from the portion agreeing to not 
to anyone else except plaintiff. 
foregoing furnishes sufficient ground for reversal, but 
there is an additional reason why a reversal should be ordered 
because of the defendant's plea of res ju-
dicata. 
'l'he record shows that on lVIay 17th the plaintiff filed 
in matter of the estate of his deceased wife a petition 
to determine heirship in which he alleged that the decedent 
left will executed on April18, 1945 (which provided therein 
for the plaintiff) ; that she made a codicil thereto dated 
20, 1945 (by which the decedent excluded the plaintiff 
the will as a beneficiary) ; that the plaintiff and the 
deeedent were married on .January 15, 1949; that by reason 
marriage the decedent died intestate as to the plaintiff 
Prob. Code, § 70; Estate Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280 
789]), and that he was the heir of the decedent as her 
""~~-'--'-- spouse Prob. Code, §§ 221, 223, 224). The 
to determine heirship prayed that the court declare 
of the parties and ''determine to whom distribution 
of said estate should be made." 
his petition the plaintiff as an heir of the decedent 
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in probate 
HlHli'r section 1080 of the Probate Code. 'l'he court determined 
the present action. 
in at its conclusion 
to one-half is 
to decide 
that 
before the commencement of 




. ) It mattered not whether 
found the to be com. 
It had the power to decide the question 
in the petition and the determination 
therein is res judicata. The fact that the petition also sought 
to have the entire estate declared to be community property 
did not oust the court sitting in probate of jurisdiction to 
determine the question of heirship. Anything in the Estate 
Kurt, 83 Cal..1:\pp.2d 681 [189 P.2d 528], inconsistent with 
the conclusion herein is disapproved. Because of what has 
been said a retrial of the cause becomes unnecessary. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed 
to enter judgment awarding the plaintiff one-half of the 
property of the decedent and such other relief as may flow 
from his ownership and right to possession thereof. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the judgment on the sole ground 
that the question presented is res judicata. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
The petition of respondent Security-First National Bank 
for a rehearing was denied July 24, 1956. Spence, J., did not 
participate therein. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
B 
VJ 
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